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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 Carl Kreschollek appeals from the district court's 
order dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction his 
complaint interposing a facial challenge to the constitutionality 
of section 14 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act (Longshore Act or Act).  The district court so ruled after 
concluding that Kreschollek's claim could be raised in his 
pending administrative proceeding and thereafter on review in 
this court.  Although we have previously held that the 
administrative review scheme provided in the Longshore Act 
supplants district court jurisdiction over claims for benefits, 
Kreschollek's claim presents a new twist on the question because 
his challenge to the Longshore Act is a constitutional one and he 
claims that the review process established by the Act is 
insufficient to address his injuries. 
I. 
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 Kreschollek suffered a work-related injury on or about 
March 20, 1990 while employed as a longshoreman by Southern 
Stevedoring Co.  Southern did not controvert its liability for 
benefits, and in late June of that same year it undertook 
voluntary compensation for Kreschollek's disability pursuant to 
33 U.S.C. § 914(b).  It continued such payments until October 29, 
1992.  Thereafter, it filed a notice of controversion with the 
District Director of the Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, asserting that Kreschollek was now able to return to 
work.  Kreschollek contested the termination of compensation and, 
after an informal conference produced no resolution, the District 
Director, upon request by Kreschollek, transferred the case with 
his recommendations to the Department of Labor for a formal 
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).  See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 919(c), (d) (1994); 20 C.F.R. § 702.301 (1995).  An ALJ held a 
hearing on the case on December 15, 1993.   
 While the matter was pending before the ALJ, 
Kreschollek filed this action in the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey invoking jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and alleging that the review procedure under the 
Act is unconstitutional because it does not require a 
predeprivation hearing before employers who voluntarily 
compensated injured employees may terminate those benefits. 
Kreschollek sought restoration of his benefits, a declaration 
from the district court that section 14 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§914, is unconstitutional, an injunction against termination of 
his benefits without a prior evidentiary hearing, and attorney's 
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fees and costs.  Named as defendants were Southern Stevedoring 
Co.; Robert Reich, Secretary of Labor; R. David Lotz, Regional 
Director, Region III, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs; 
and Lumberman Mutual Casualty Co.  All defendants moved to 
dismiss. 
 The ALJ's final decision on Kreschollek's 
administrative claim for benefits and the district court's ruling 
on the motion to dismiss were handed down within days of each 
other in March 1995.  The ALJ denied Kreschollek's request for 
additional benefits.  That ruling, which Kreschollek appealed to 
the Benefits Review Board, is not before us at this time. 
 The district court, in the decision that is on appeal 
to us, granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, holding that in light of the detailed 
administrative and judicial review procedure provided by the Act, 
Kreschollek's constitutional challenge must be raised in the 
court of appeals after exhaustion of administrative remedies, 
rather than in the district court through 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
II. 
A. 
 The sole issue on appeal is whether the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq., 
precludes district court review of Kreschollek's constitutional 
challenge to the Act.  Although Kreschollek concedes that his 
claim for benefits must be adjudicated through the Act's 
administrative review procedure, he argues that the district 
court nonetheless has jurisdiction over his collateral 
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constitutional challenge to the adjudicatory process provided 
under the Act.  
 This court previously addressed the more general 
question of whether the Longshore Act supplants district court 
jurisdiction over claims challenging the Secretary's 
interpretation of the Act.  Although that case arose in the 
context of the Black Lung Benefits Act, the Black Lung Benefits 
Act incorporates the scheme of administrative and judicial review 
of benefits determinations set forth in the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act, see 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1994), and 
decisions thereunder are of obvious applicability.  
 In Compensation Department of District Five, United 
Mine Workers of America v. Marshall, 667 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1981), 
the United Mine Workers of America brought an action in federal 
district court to enjoin the Secretary of Labor from rereading X-
rays of claimants seeking benefits pursuant to the Black Lung 
Benefits Act.  The Union contended that the Black Lung Act 
required the Secretary, ALJ and Benefits Review Board (Board) to 
accept the x-ray reading made by the claimant's medical expert. 
The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and this court affirmed, determining that 
"the scheme of review established by Congress for determinations 
of black lung disability benefits was intended to be exclusive." 
Id. at 340.   
 Several considerations led to our determination. First, 
we noted the general rule that if "there exists a special 
statutory review procedure, it is ordinarily supposed that 
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Congress intended that procedure to be the exclusive means of 
obtaining judicial review in those cases to which it applies." 
Id. (quoting City of Rochester v. Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 931 (D.C. 
Cir. 1979)).  Moreover, we recognized the "strong presumption 
against the availability of simultaneous review in both the 
district court and the court of appeals."  Id. (quoting Sun 
Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 532 F.2d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 1976)).   
 We next considered whether "the statute's legislative 
history, purpose, and design" suggested that the circumstances of 
the particular case should overcome the presumption, id., and 
concluded that they did not.  In reaching this conclusion, we 
considered the following: 1) the Benefits Review Board was 
created to provide uniformity in application of the Act and to 
prevent duplication of review; 2) the Act was amended in 1972 in 
part to oust the district courts from jurisdiction over benefits 
claims; 3) Congress's provision for review of Board 
determinations in the court of appeals reflected its intention to 
require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to seeking 
judicial review; and 4) permitting the Board and district court 
to consider the same issue would create a danger of duplicative 
and conflicting litigation.  We acknowledged, however, that in 
certain circumstances, such as if the remedies available through 
the statutory scheme of review are inadequate, a district court 
might have subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint involving 
the Black Lung Benefits Act.  Id. at 341-44.   
 The issue of preclusion of district court jurisdiction 
for claims arising under the Black Lung Act arose again in 
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Connors v. Tremont Mining Co., 835 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1987).  In 
Connors, a union Benefit Plan and Trust sought reimbursement from 
coal mine operators for medical benefits it had paid to a large 
number of black lung claimants.  The Plan argued that the issue 
was governed by the terms of the Plan, which was covered by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and therefore it invoked 
federal question jurisdiction.  We rejected the Plan's attempt to 
assert jurisdiction in the district court, holding once again 
that in a case involving disability benefits pursuant to the 
Black Lung Benefits Act, federal question jurisdiction is 
supplanted by the procedure established by the statute.  Id. at 
1030-31. 
 The reasoning of Compensation Department and Connors is 
consistent with the approach taken by the Supreme Court in its 
recent decision in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 
771 (1994), raising a similar issue in the context of the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977 (Mine Act). Thunder 
Basin, a mine operator, sued in district court challenging the 
Mine Safety and Health Administration's instruction that it post 
the names of the two representatives its employees had chosen 
pursuant to the Mine Act to participate in mine inspections, 
obtain certain health and safety information and promote health 
and safety enforcement.  The mine operator's objection was that 
the designated representatives were not its employees, but were 
employed by the union.  Although there was a statutory procedure 
for administrative review of a citation for violation of such an 
order, the mine operator challenged the Administration's 
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interpretation of the Mine Act as permitting such designations by 
seeking a pre-enforcement injunction from the district court.  It 
argued that designation of union representatives who were not its 
employees violated the principles of collective-bargaining 
representation under the National Labor Relations Act and 
infringed its right to exclude union organizers from its 
property.  It also argued that the Administrator's action 
violated its Fifth Amendment due process rights by compelling it 
to choose between violating the Act and enduring the irreparable 
harm that it would allegedly suffer because of organizing 
advantages the union would gain as a result of the designation. 
 A unanimous Supreme Court held that the district court 
lacked jurisdiction over the pre-enforcement challenge.  The 
Court stated that determination of whether a statute is intended 
to preclude initial judicial review is made from "the statute's 
language, structure, and purpose, its legislative history, and 
whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review."  Thunder 
Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776 (citations omitted).   
 Although the Mine Act is silent on the question of pre-
enforcement claims, the Court looked at the detailed structure of 
the Act, which requires a mine operator to challenge a citation 
issued within 30 days; provides for review by an administrative 
law judge (ALJ), and possibly thereafter by the Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission), which must 
expedite review if necessary; and gives a mine operator the 
opportunity to challenge an adverse Commission decision in the 
appropriate court of appeals.  There is express provision for 
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district court jurisdiction in only two instances: one empowering 
the Secretary to seek to enjoin habitual violations of health and 
safety standards and the other to coerce payment of civil 
penalties.   
 The Court concluded that the comprehensive review 
process provided within the Act signified an intent by Congress 
that most challenges would be heard within that process. 
Moreover, there was an emphasis in the legislative history on the 
need to improve penalties and enforcement measures and streamline 
the review process.  This totality of factors led the Supreme 
Court to find that Congress intended to preclude district court 
jurisdiction over ordinary challenges under the Mine Act.  Id. at 
777-79. 
 The Secretary argues that the reasoning of Thunder 
Basin and the Court's treatment of the Mine Act lead ineluctably 
to the conclusion that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
over Kreschollek's claim under the Longshore Act.  We agree that 
Thunder Basin bolsters our earlier conclusion in Compensation 
Department that Congress intended that district court 
jurisdiction over most claims pertaining to benefits be 
precluded.  Certainly, the review scheme provided in the 
Longshore Act is comparable in its comprehensiveness to that of 
the Mine Act.  Under section 14(h) of the Longshore Act, the 
district director must initiate an investigation upon receiving 
notice from the employer that "payments of compensation have been 
stopped."  33 U.S.C. § 914(h) (1994).  Where the parties' dispute 
is not resolved by means of an informal conference, see 33 U.S.C. 
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§ 914(h) (1994); 20 C.F.R. § 702.301 (1995), then an ALJ must 
conduct a full evidentiary hearing, 33 U.S.C. § 919(c), (d) 
(1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 702.316, 702.331-.351 (1995).  Either party 
may request review by the Benefits Review Board and thereafter by 
the appropriate court of appeals.  33 U.S.C. § 921(b), (c) 
(1994).   
 The Longshore Act, like the Mine Act construed in 
Thunder Basin, confers jurisdiction in the district court only in 
limited circumstances not applicable here.  One such circumstance 
covers the situation when an employer fails to comply with a 
final compensation order making an award, and authorizes the 
beneficiary of the award or the district director making the 
order to apply to the district court for enforcement.  33 U.S.C. 
§ 921(d) (1994).  Another such provision allows the Secretary to 
bring an action in district court to restrain violations of the 
Act's safety rules and regulations.  33 U.S.C. § 941(e) (1994). 
As in Thunder Basin, the comprehensive nature of the 
administrative review scheme and its limited provision for 
district court jurisdiction make "fairly discernible" a 
Congressional intent to preclude district court jurisdiction over 
most claims under the Act.  114 S. Ct. at 776 (quoting Block v. 
Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984)).   
 The legislative history of the Longshore Act also 
supports this reading.  Before the Act was amended in 1972, it 
provided for deputy commissioners to resolve disputed claims by 
conducting evidentiary hearings and issuing initial decisions, 
which were reviewable in district court and ultimately in the 
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courts of appeals.  See Compensation Dept., 667 F.2d at 341; 
Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 381-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).  Although effort at informal 
resolution of disputed claims continued to rest with deputy 
commissioners (renamed as district directors, see 20 C.F.R. 
§701.301(a)(7) (1995)), the 1972 amendments transferred to ALJs 
the formal adjudication of claims. The ALJ's decision was made 
reviewable by the Board to determine from the record developed 
before the ALJ if the decision was in accordance with law and 
supported by substantial evidence.  Kalaris, 697 F.2d at 382. The 
Board now performs the identical function that the district 
courts performed before the 1972 amendments, eliminating the role 
of the district courts in the claims process.  See Compensation 
Dept., 667 F.2d at 342.  Thus, the changes effected by the 1972 
amendments further support reading the Act to preclude district 
court jurisdiction over ordinary challenges.  
B. 
 This conclusion does not end our inquiry.  We must 
proceed to consider, as the Court did in Thunder Basin, whether 
the claim asserted is of the type Congress intended to be 
reviewed within the Act's statutory structure.  See Thunder 
Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 779.  In that connection, the Court noted 
its own precedent upholding district court jurisdiction over 
"wholly collateral" claims, "particularly where a finding of 
preclusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review."  Id. 
at 779.    
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 The Court's own discussion in Thunder Basin of its 
earlier cases permitting district court jurisdiction over 
collateral claims serves as a useful textbook exegesis of the 
situations in which district court jurisdiction is not deemed 
precluded, and it is useful to quote it in full.  The Court 
stated: 
This Court previously has upheld district 
court jurisdiction over claims considered 
"wholly 'collateral'" to a statute's review 
provisions and outside the agency's 
expertise, Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 
618, 104 S. Ct. 2013, 2023, 80 L. Ed. 2d 622 
(1984), discussing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 
(1976), particularly where a finding of 
preclusion could foreclose all meaningful 
judicial review.  See Traynor v. Turnage, 485 
U.S. 535, 544-545, 108 S. Ct. 1372, 1380, 99 
L. Ed. 2d 618 (1988) (statutory prohibition 
of all judicial review of Veterans 
Administration benefits determinations did 
not preclude [district court] jurisdiction 
over an otherwise unreviewable collateral 
statutory claim); Bowen v. Michigan Academy 
of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 678-680, 
106 S. Ct. 2133, 2140-2141, 90 L. Ed. 2d 623 
(1986); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 
373-374, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 1168-1169, 39 L. Ed. 
2d 389 (1974); Oestereich v. Selective 
Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 237-238, 89 S. Ct. 
414, 416-417, 21 L. Ed. 2d 402 (1968); Leedom 
v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 190, 79 S. Ct. 180, 
184, 3 L. Ed. 2d 210 (1958) (upholding 
injunction [over otherwise unreviewable 
bargaining unit determination] of agency 
action where petitioners had "no other means 
within their control . . . to protect and 
enforce that right").  
 
Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 779. 
 The cases referred to by the Court in the above 
discussion provide the legal authority for Kreschollek's argument 
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that there is district court jurisdiction over his claim.   In 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court held that the 
provision of the Social Security Act that required exhaustion of 
administrative remedies before the denial of benefits could be 
challenged in district court was not intended to bar federal 
jurisdiction over a due process challenge to the lack of a 
pretermination hearing.  The Court explained that that issue was 
"entirely collateral" to the denial of benefits, and the claimant 
had made a colorable showing that he could not obtain full relief 
at a postdeprivation hearing.  Id. at 330. 
  In McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 
(1991), also referred to in Thunder Basin, the Court held that an 
alien could challenge in district court the constitutionality of 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) procedures used to 
process claims of alien farmworkers for "special agricultural 
worker" status under the Immigration Reform and Control Act, even 
though the Immigration and Naturalization Act expressly barred 
judicial review of individual determinations except in 
deportation and exclusion proceedings.  The McNary Court held 
that the preclusion of review applied only to denials of 
individual applications, and not to a constitutional claim 
alleging a broad "pattern and practice" that was collateral to 
petitioners' substantive claim for special status.  498 U.S. at 
491-94.  
 The Court in Thunder Basin distinguished this long line 
of earlier cases from Thunder Basin's situation.  First, it 
explained that Thunder Basin's challenge to the designation of 
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nonemployees as the miners' representatives required 
interpretation of the parties' rights and duties under the Mine 
Act and its regulations, thus implicating subjects within the 
Commission's expertise.  Second, although constitutional 
challenges were generally considered beyond the jurisdiction of 
administrative agencies, under the Mine Act the reviewing body 
was not the agency itself but an independent commission created 
to review agency decisions, and in any event Thunder Basin would 
have an opportunity to present its claims to the appropriate 
court of appeals.  Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 779-80. 
 Of course, Kreschollek's claim, and the statute and 
circumstances involved, bear some similarity to those in Thunder 
Basin.  Like the Commission at issue in Thunder Basin, the 
Benefits Review Board is competent to hear claimants' legal 
contentions, see 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (1994) ("The Board shall 
be authorized to hear and determine appeals raising a substantial 
question of law or fact taken by any party in interest . . . with 
respect to claims" under the Longshore Act).  Like the 
complainant mine operator in Thunder Basin, Kreschollek may seek 
review in the court of appeals, see 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1994) 
("Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of 
the Board may obtain a review of that order in the United States 
court of appeals . . . .").  And the Longshore Act does contain 
an express preclusion provision: "Proceedings for suspending, 
setting aside, or enforcing a compensation order, whether 
rejecting a claim or making an award, shall not be instituted 
otherwise than as provided in this section and section 918 of 
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this title."  § 921(e).  The Act is silent, however, as to 
whether constitutional challenges to the Act must be brought 
within the administrative claim process.   
 Although there have been instances in which 
administrative agencies have been deemed capable of dealing with 
constitutional issues in the first instance, see, e.g., Thunder 
Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780, "[a]djudication of the 
constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been 
thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative agencies," 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974) (quoting Oestereich 
v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., 
concurring in result).  This point was also made in Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977), where the Court noted that 
"[c]onstitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution 
in administrative hearing procedures . . . ."  This principle 
could most aptly be applied if judicial review would not 
otherwise be available, see, e.g., Bowen v. Michigan Academy of 
Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 678-680 (1986), but it is 
equally pertinent in this case because the result, albeit not 
necessarily the absence of any judicial review at all, might well 
be the absence of any effective judicial review.   
 Kreschollek argues with some persuasiveness that in 
this respect his case shares more important similarities with the 
Mathews v. Eldridge line of cases than with Thunder Basin.  As in 
Mathews, Kreschollek's claim that he has a constitutional right 
to a pretermination hearing is entirely collateral to his claim 
of entitlement to benefits.  Moreover, unlike the situation 
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presented in Thunder Basin, where the mine operator sought to 
circumvent the administrative procedure and enjoin enforcement 
proceedings, Kreschollek's attempt to seek a declaration of his 
right to a pretermination hearing is in no way inimical to the 
purpose of the Act and its amendments, which is to create an 
effective process of providing adequate benefits to injured 
employees, see Schmit v. ITT Fed. Elec. Int'l, 986 F.2d 1103, 
1106 (7th Cir. 1993); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4698, 4698-99, 4711.   
 The critical distinction, however, is that in this case 
the administrative process is insufficient to provide Kreschollek 
the full relief to which he may be entitled.  In Mathews, the 
Court noted that "[a] claim to a predeprivation hearing as a 
matter of constitutional right rests on the proposition that full 
relief cannot be obtained at a postdeprivation hearing."  424 
U.S. at 331.  In Thunder Basin, the Court rejected the operator's 
argument that due process required district court review because 
it found that "neither compliance with, nor continued violation 
of, the statute will subject [Thunder Basin] to a serious 
prehearing deprivation."  Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 781. 
Kreschollek, on the other hand, is more clearly at risk of 
irreparable harm due to the lack of a pretermination hearing. 
Kreschollek's benefits were terminated on October 29, 1992, and 
he contends he has been unable to return to work due to his 
disability.  App. at 56.  Thus he was deprived of all earned 
income for almost two-and-a-half years from the time that his 
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benefits were terminated until the ALJ issued a decision in March 
of 1995.   
 The inadequacy of the administrative review scheme to 
address the harm at issue - here, the lack of a pretermination 
hearing - is precisely the sort of situation which we envisioned 
in Compensation Department would permit a district court to 
exercise jurisdiction over a claim involving the Act.  See 
Compensation Dept., 667 F.2d at 343.  Notably, unlike the Mine 
Act involved in Thunder Basin, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act does not provide for expedited review of 
benefits determinations. As in Mathews, Kreschollek "has raised 
at least a colorable claim that because of his physical condition 
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and dependency upon the disability benefits, an erroneous 
termination would damage him in a way not recompensable through 
retroactive payments."  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 331.  It follows 
that Kreschollek has alleged a sufficiently serious irreparable 
injury to lead us to conclude that the administrative review 
process is insufficient to afford him full relief. 
 Although Kreschollek has presented the same 
constitutional questions in the administrative proceeding, the 
danger of conflicting and duplicative litigation over which the 
Supreme Court expressed concern in Whitney National Bank v. Bank 
of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S. 411, 422 (1965), and which 
factored into our decision in Compensation Department is 
minimized in this case.  By addressing only the constitutional 
claims, the district court decision will have no bearing upon the 
merits of Kreschollek's claim of entitlement to continuing 
disability benefits.  Thus, the procedural problems presented by 
a pending district court claim should not present an 
insurmountable barrier to the exercise of district court 
jurisdiction.  We are confident that the district court and the 
parties can fashion a workable solution should the issue arise. 
Kreschollek's counsel conceded at oral argument that at some 
point he may have to make a decision as to his forum.  
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III. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
order of dismissal and remand to the district court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
